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I. INTRODUCTION
In order to deal more effectively with the problem of driving while
under the influence of intoxicating beverages, several states have enacted
"implied consent" statutes which state that the act of driving constitutes
an implied consent to submit to a chemical test to determine the blood
alcohol level in the body.1 Under these statutes a motorist who refuses to
take the test may have his license suspended.
The Florida "implied consent" statute,2 which goes into effect on July
1, 1968, provides that every person who accepts the privilege of driving
within the state shall be deemed to have given his con'ent to an approved
chemical test of his breath, urine, saliva or blood if he is arrested for
driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. Paradoxically,
even though the driver has "consented" to a chemical test, the statute
* Associate Editor, University of Miami Law Review; Student Instructor for Freshman
Research and Writing.
1. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (1964); IDAHO CODE § 49-352 (1955), as amended,
ch. 362, § 3 (1963); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 8-1001 (1963); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.123 (Supp.
1967); NEB. REV. STAT. § 39-727.03 (1960); N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1194(1)
(McKinney 1960); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-16.2 (1963); N.D. CENTURY CODE ANN. § 39-20-01
(1965); S.D. CODE § 44.0302-2 (Supp. 1960); UTAH CODE ANN. .§ 41-6-44.10 (1953); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 23 § 1188 (1965); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55 (Supp. 1960).
For general discussions on implied consent statutes and compulsory chemical testing
see Weinstein, Statute Compelling Submission to a Chemical Test for Intoxication, 45 J.
Caui. L.C. & P.S. 541 (1955); Comment, Virginia's Implied Consent Statute: A Survey and
Appraisal, 49 VA. L. REV. 386 (1963); Gunn, Comment, Chemical Tests and Implied Consent,
42 N.C.L. REV. 841 (1964); and Slough & Wilson, Alcohol and the Motorist: Practical and
Legal Problems of Chemical Testing, 44 MncN. L. REV. 673 (1960).
For a book that is mainly prosecutor oriented see R. DONIGAN, CHEMICAL TESTS AND
THE LAW (2d ed. 1966). For a book on the side of the defense see R. EawIN, DEFENSE OF
DRUNK DRIvnc CASES (1963):
2. FLA. STAT. § 322.262 (1967).
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provides that he may refuse to submit. However, upon refusal, the privi-
lege of operating a motor vehicle may be suspended provided that the
driver has been told of the consequences and that a subsequent hearing is
given to him. If one of the tests is taken the results may raise certain re-




In order to give a background to the provisions of the "implied con-
sent" statute a brief sketch of the constitutional issues will be given.
Arguments used to sustain and to attack the validity of the statute will be
covered.
Two theories have been employed to sustain the constitutionality of
"implied consent" statutes.3 The first is the "right-privilege" theory under
which driving an automobile is considered a privilege (rather than a right)
and therefore subject to conditions the state may impose. In the case of
the "implied consent" statute the privilege of driving is conditioned upon
the driver waiving his constitutional right-assuming such a right exists-
to refuse to submit to a chemical test whenever he is arrested for driving
while intoxicated.
Since driving is constantly referred to in the statute as a "privilege,"
it would appear that the Florida "implied consent" statute is based upon
the right-privilege theory." Florida cases decided prior to the enactment
of this statute also support this view.'
The second theory involves a due process analysis. According to this
view, whether driving is labelled a right or a privilege makes no difference.
Because of the social and economic importance of an automobile and its
inherently dangerous nature, a statute which limits its use will be consti-
tutional so long as it is a reasonable exercise of the state's police power
and due process of law is not violated.' To satisfy the due process require-
3. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 543-44 and 49 VA. L. REv. 386 at 388. See also Note,
Chemical Tests For Intoxication: A Legal, Medical, and Constitutional Survey, 37 N.DL.
REV. 212, 252 (1961).
4. "The bill is based on the premise that driving is a privilege, not an absolute right."
Statement by state Senator Eddie Gong, co-sponsor of the Implied Consent Law, in a letter
to Professor Daniel E. Murray, July 7, 1967.
5. Smith v. Gainesville, 93 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla. 1965) ("a driver's license is a privilege,
subject to proper regulations. It does not endow the holder thereof with an absolute property
right in the use of a public highway"); Thornhill v. Kirkman, 62 So.2d 740, 742 (Fla. 1953)
("there is ample warrant for the legislature to treat a driver's license as a privilege").
6. As expressed by Judge Magruder in Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (lst Cir. 1953):
[ilt is unimportant whether, for one purpose or another, a license to operate motor
vehicles may properly be described as a mere personal privilege rather than a prop-
erty right. We have no doubt that the freedom to make use of one's own property,
here a motor vehicle, as a means of getting about from place to place, whether in
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ment, the statute must: (1) be aimed at a legitimate end, i.e., the expul-
sion from the highways of intoxicated drivers, (2) be reasonably designed
to accomplish these ends, and (3) seek to protect against a danger which
warrants an infringement of an individual's liberty whenever he is reason-
ably believed to be driving while intoxicated.7
Implied consent statutes and the use of chemical tests have been
traditionally subject to constitutional attacks on grounds that they vio-
late: (1) the privilege against self-incrimination, (2) the protection
against unreasonable search and seizure, and (3) due process of law.
Despite these attacks, the statutes have been upheld by the various state
supreme courts.8 The United States Supreme Court, however, has never
decided the constitutionality of such statutes.'
B. Self-incrimination
The most common attack upon statutes providing for the use of
chemical tests is that they violate the privilege against self -incrimination.10
Under the traditional and majority view the scope of the privilege is lim-
ited to "testimonial compulsions."" The Supreme Court of the United
States, in the leading case of Schmerber v. California, accepted this view
when in deciding the issue of whether withdrawal of blood and admission
in evidence of the analysis violates an individual's privilege against self-
incrimination it held that:
[T]he privilege protects an accused only from being compelled
to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the
pursuit of business or pleasure, is a 'liberty' which under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment cannot be denied or curtailed by a state without due process of law.
7. See Weinstein, supra note 1, at 545-47.
8. Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566, 358 P.2d 765 (1961); Prucha v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961); Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143
N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955). Prior to Anderson, the New York statute (the first implied
consent statute enacted in the United States) although declared fundamentally sound was
struck down on the constitutional grounds that it deprived motorists of due process by fail-
ing to require a hearing and because it failed to contain a provision limiting its application
to cases where there had been lawful arrests. See Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127
N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954). These defects were overcome when the statute was amended.
The fact that a choice is available to the driver is one factor that has sustained the con-
stitutionality of such statutes. See Walton v. City of Roanoke, 204 Va. 678, 133 S.E.2d 315
(1963).
9. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 435 n.2 (1957), Justice Clark commented upon
the Kansas statute with apparent approval. In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966),
the California implied consent statute had not been enacted. However, it seems only logical
that if the Court in Schmerber found a compulsory blood test to be constitutional without
a statute then a fortiori the Court would find chemical tests constitutional under a reasonable
statute in which the individual has a choice of submission or refusal.
10. E.g., People v. Duroncelay, 48 Cal. 2d. 766, 312 P.2d 690 (1957) ; State v. Durant,
188 A.2d 526 (Del. 1963).
11. For a history of the privilege see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2263 at 378 (McNaugh-
ton rev. 1961). As stated by Wigmore, the privilege "was directed at the employment of the
legal process to extract from the person's own lips an admission of guilt ... "
COMMENT
withdrawal of blood and use of the analysis in question. . . did
not involve compulsion to these ends. 2
Thus, compulsion which makes an accused the source of real or physical
evidence such as fingerprints, photographs, measurements, and writing or
speaking for identification purposes does not violate the fifth amendment
privilege.'" A strong minority view would extend the scope of the privilege
to any evidence secured from the accused by compulsion. 4
C. Search and Seizure
The argument is also made that chemical analysis introduced in evi-
dence should be excluded as the product of an unconstitutional search and
seizure.' 5 In Schmerber the Court recognized that the blood test was
clearly within the purview of the fourth amendment, but if conducted
properly the test was not unreasonable per se.'8 Whether the test is admis-
sible depends on the answers to two important questions: (1) were the
12. Schmerber v. 'California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966). The Court, however, did not
limit the scope of the privilege to Wigmore's view of testimonial disclosures. "Our holding
today, however, is not to be understood as adopting the Wigmore formulation." Id. at 763 n.7.
13. A case relied on heavily by the Court was Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910)
where the accused, under protest, was compelled to put on a blouse. In rejecting the con-
tention that modeling the blouse violated the accused's privilege against self-incrimination
as "an extravagant extension of the 5th Amendment," Justice Holmes stated that "[Tlhe
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a pro-
hibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not
an exclusion of his body as evidence when it may be material. The objection in principle
would forbid a jury to look at a prisoner and compare his features with a photograph in
proof." Id. at 252-3.
14. See the dissenting opinions of Black, Douglas and Fortas in Schmerber v. California,
384 U.S. 757, 773. The underlying difference between the two views depends upon how one
sees the purpose of the privilege against self-incrimination. The argument for making the
distinction between testimonial and real evidence is that testimony might be subject to change
under the influence of compulsion upon the accused, but real evidence such as fingerprints
or bodily fluids would be the same whether taken with or without the consent of the ac-
cused. Such evidence manifests conduct which does not involve the veracity of the accused.
Those who feel that the privilege should be given a broad scope argue that the purpose of
the privilege is not just to guard against unreliable evidence but to protect the integrity of
the individual and a narrow construction of the fifth amendment narrows the constitutional
protection.
15. Id. at 766. In Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 434 (1957), the Supreme Court
was faced with the same contention but rejected it because at that time the exclusionary
rule did not apply to the states.
16. 384 U.S. at 757 (1966). "Such testing procedures plainly constitute searches of
'persons' and depend antecedently upon seizures of persons, within the meaning of the
Amendment."
An interesting question is whether the "taking" of breath by the police with a breath-
alyzer comes within the scope of the Fourth amendment. In State v. Berg, 76 Ariz. 96, 259
P.2d 261 (1953), the court said that a compulsory breathalyzer test was not a search and
seizure.
We can see no legal difference in the right to a specimen of defendant's breath to
be used as evidence in cases of drunk driving where the body of the person is neither
invaded or assaulted and the right to search his person and premises and seizing such
physical evidence as deemed necessary to procure a conviction of the crime for
which he was arrested.
Id. at 102, 259 P.2d at 266.
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police justified in requiring the driver to submit to a blood test, and (2)
were the methods and procedures of the chemical test reasonable.'"
First, the police must have a "clear indication"'" that the motorist is
intoxicated before a chemical test can be taken. Generally, a search war-
rant is required for the searches of dwellings and the Court felt that the
same requirement should apply for "intrusions into the human body."
However, there is an exception to the requirement in the case of an emer-
gency or special circumstance such as where the evidence will be de-
stroyed. Since alcohol in the blood stream is absorbed within a few hours,
the attempt to secure it as evidence of the driver's intoxication does not
necessitate a search warrant where the search is an appropriate incident
to arrest.
Second, fourth amendment standards of reasonableness must be re-
spected. The test used must be reasonable and be performed in a reason-
able manner. For a blood test this means that the blood should be "taken
by a physician in a hospital environment according to accepted medical
practices."' It should also be remembered that the holding in Schmerber
is limited to the facts of the particular case:
That we today hold that the Constitution does not forbid
the State's minor intrusions into an individual's body under
stringently limited conditions in no way indicates that it permits
more substantal intrusions, or intrusions under other conditions.
(emphasis added) 20
D. Due Process
The issue of whether the compulsory taking of a blood test consti-
tutes a violation of the "due process" clause of the fourteenth amendment
was settled in Breithaupt v. Abram,2 where a blood test was taken while
the defendant was unconscious. In distinguishing the earlier case of
Rochin v. California22 where the Court had found that the use of a
stomach pump to extract capsules of morphine the defendant had swal-
lowed was conduct that "shocks the conscience," the Court in Briethaupt
17. 384 U.S. 757, 768 (1966).
18. Id. at 770. Since the search involves intrusions into the body, a different standard
of "reasonable cause" will probably be required by the Court. Although the difference may
be one of semantics, clear indication is not synonymous with probable cause.
The "clear indication" requirement, however, does not mean that the police must be
convinced that the driver is intoxicated. It is sufficient if they believe that he has consumed
enough alcohol for his driving ability to have been impaired. Being under the "influence of
alcohol" and being intoxicated do not refer to the same levels of drunkenness.
19. Id. at 771. The Court suggests that it would arrive at a different result if the test
were made by other than medical personnel or in other than a medical environment, for ex-
ample, if it were made by the police in the privacy of the station house.
20. Id. at 772.
21. 352 U.S. 432 (1957).
22. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
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said that there was nothing "offensive" or "brutal" in a blood test when
done "under the protective eye of a physician."2 Blood tests, the Court
reasoned, have become routine in our everyday life. When administered
by a physician it cannot be regarded as conduct that shocks the conscience.
In Schmerber, with Breithaupt as authority, the due process argu-
ment was rejected and the Court noted that "nothing in the circumstances
of this case, or in supervening events persuades us" that this aspect of
Breithaupt should be overruled. 4
E. Other Attacks
The contention was made in Schmerber that the compulsory blood
test was a denial of the petitioner's right to counsel. This claim was re-
jected in short order on the basis of the absence of the privilege against
self-incrimination:
Since petitioner was not entitled to assert the privilege, he has no
greater right because counsel erroneously advised him he could
assert it. His claim is strictly limited to the failure of the police
to respect his wish, reinforced by counsel's advice to be left in-
violate. No issue of counsel's ability to assist petitioner in re-
spect of any rights he did possess is presented.25
23. 352 U.S. at 435 (1957).
24. 384 U.S. 757, 760 (1966).
25. Id. at 766. This holding, however, is weakened somewhat by the Supreme Court's
decisions in United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S.
263 (1967), in which the Court held that the right to counsel applies to lineups in order to
ensure that they are conducted fairly.
Should not the same protection of the right to counsel be given in administering blood
tests? In Wade, the Court noted that precedent required it to:
scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the pres-
ence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial
.. . [and] to analyze whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights
inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that
prejudice. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967) (emphasis added).
The Court distinguished a lineup from other preparatory steps, such as systematized or
scientific analyzing of the accused's fingerprints, blood sample, clothing, hair and the like:
We think there are differences which preclude such stages being characterized as
critical stages at which the accused has the right to the presence of his counsel.
Knowledge of the techniques of science and technology is sufficiently available, and
the variables in techniques few enough, that the accused has the opportunity for a
meaningful confrontation of the Government's case at trial through the ordinary
processes of cross-examination of the Government's expert witnesses and the pres-
entation of the evidence of his own experts. The denial of a right to have his counsel
present at such analyses does not therefore violate the Sixth Amendment; they are
not critical stages since there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such
stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial.
Id. at 227-28.
In regard to lineups themselves, the Court felt that they are "peculiarly riddled with
innumerable dangers and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate
from a fair trial." Thus, because of the great potential for prejudice to an accused, the
Court believed that the presence of counsel would promote fairness in the lineup and a full
hearing at trial on the issue of identification. Id. at 228.
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
A possible attack on "implied consent" statutes on the basis of an
analogy to a coerced confession has also been made.28
Another attack upon the use of chemical tests is that they violate the
physician-patient privilege. At common law the existence of privileged
communication as between physician and patient was unknown." Since
the privilege is statutory, states, such as Florida, that have not enacted
such statutes do not recognize the privilege.
The problem presented by the privilege in states where it is recog-
nized is whether the physician who is requested by an officer to draw blood
from the motorist-patient should be precluded from testifying on the
grounds of a privileged relationship. Where such a test is not necessary
for diagnosis the privilege will generally not apply since a confidential re-
lationship does not exist.2 8 A closer question is where the physician who is
called to draw blood from the patient also gives emergency treatment.29
Where the physician only withdraws blood usually no privilege will arise."0
With the physician-patient privilege in mind the best policy to insure
the admissibility in evidence is to have the blood test taken by a physician
other than the physician treating the motorist for injuries. The physician
taking the blood specimen should avoid rendering any medical treatment
at the time, as it would give rise to the privilege.
III. DETAILED PROVISIONS OF STATUTE 3 1
A. Suspension of License, Chemical Tests For Intoxication2
(1) (a) Any person who shall accept the privilege extended by the laws of
this state of operating a motor vehicle within this state ....
The first problem is to determine to whom the statute applies. Does
it apply to a nonresident motorist? Does an unlicensed driver or a person
whose license has been suspended "accept the privilege . . . of operating
a motor vehicle within the state?" Section J of the statute states that a
26. See Comment, Implied Consent to a Chemical Test For Intoxication: Doubts About
Section 6-205 of the Uniform Vehicle Code, 31 U. CHi. L. REv. 603 (1964).
27. See C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 101 (1954).
28. "It is manifestly clear from the reason upon which the privilege is based and from
the decided cases that where no treatment is made or contemplated, there exists no re-
lationship between the doctor and patient that will support the privilege." Ladd & Gibson,
The Medico-Legal Aspecs of the Blood Test to Determine Intoxication, 24 IOWA L. REV.
191, 254 (1939).
29. E.g., Schwartz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W.2d 756 (1955) (confidential
relationship not established).
30. Williams v. Hendrickson, 189 Kan. 673, 371 P.2d 188 (1962) (doctor who was not
defendant's physician withdrew blood from defendant). The court held that no physician-
patient relationship existed.
31. In this section the attempt will be made to interpret the "implied consent" statute
on the basis of the wording and to predict some of the questions and problems which will
probably arise under the statute.
32. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 322 (1965).
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".. . nonresident or any other person driving in a status exempt. from
the requirements of the. driver's license law shall by his act of driving in
such exempt status be deemed to have expressed his consent to the pro-
visions of this section." This takes care of the nonresident motorist prob-
lem. An unlicensed driver, however, whether a Florida citizen or a citizen
of another state, is not included in the category of persons who are exempt
from obtaining a driver's license2 3
The problem of the unlicensed driver is created because the Florida
statute is based on the "right-privilege" theory. No doubt a court faced
with this question will hold the statute applicable since it does not seem
fair to apply the statute only to licensed drivers.34 It would have been
much easier, however, for the statute to simply read anyone who operates
a motor vehicle within the state shall come within the statute.5 In this
way the unlicensed driver problem is avoided and the statute applies
equally to all drivers, the statute being contingent only upon the act of
driving within the state.
Another problem revolves around what is meant by "operating a
motor vehicle within this state." No doubt the provision as to what is
operating a motor vehicle will be interpreted liberally as is similar lan-
guage in the long-arm nonresident motorist statute.
3 6
The phrase "within the state" would appear to apply to both public
and private roads. However, elsewhere in the statute in referring to the
unconscious driver the statute reads ". . . privilege to operate a motor
vehicle upon the public highways of this state."
3 8
33. See FLA. STAT. § 322.04 (1965). Generally persons exempt from obtaining a driver's
license are governmental employees, persons driving farm equipment and nonresident
licensed drivers.
34. See [1949-1950] FLA. ATr'Y GEN. BixNmx, REP. 570, where is was stated that a
man can be guilty of two charges at the same time such as operating a motor vehicle while
intoxicated and also operating a motor vehicle without having first obtained a valid license.
35. See, e.g., UNIFORM VEHICLE CODE art. I § 6-205.1.
36. FLA. STAT. § 48.171 (1967). See Hurte v. Lane, 166 F. Supp. 413 (N.D. Fla. 1958)
where the nonresident defendant was operating an auto when he turned on the ignition and
pressed the starter. "To make the actual movement of the wheels of the vehicle the test of
'operation' under these circumstances would be to give the statute such rigid limitation as
to be unrealistic." Id. at 413.
37. See [1955-1956] FLA. Ar'Y GEN. BIENNwA REP. 557. "While I am by no means
certain, until a court of competent jurisdiction says otherwise, I am inclined to believe that
the reckless driving statute, as well as the driving while intoxicated statute, embraces both
on and off the public highways of the state." Id. at 558.
38. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 322 (1965). See CONN. GEN.
STAT. AiNN. § 14-227(b) (1964), where it expressly states that the offense must occur on a
public highway.
One question that comes to mind under a statute based on the privilege theory is
whether it is a right or a privilege to drive an automobile on private property? Can a
motorist drive his car solely on private property without a license? If he can do so without
a license, how can a "privilege" statute apply to driving on private property?
In this connection see Green v. Pederson, 99 So.2d 292 (Fla. 1957), where the court
in talking about a miniature trackless train owned by the appellee said that:
[If the train had never been and did not expect to go outside the bounds of the
1968]
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. . . shall by so operating such vehicle be deemed to have given his con-
sent to, submit to an approved chemical test ....
This is the "implied consent" part of the statute. Some statutes re-
quire that the driver's express consent be given.89
The talk of "implied consent" is fictitious. The real basis of the state
to compel a motorist to take a chemical test is the state's police power,
which must not violate requirements of due process. Originally, nonresi-
dent motorist long-arm statutes also were based on the theory of implied
consent. 40 But the Supreme Court has shown that it considers the under-
lying basis to be the state's police power.4 '
The rationale for invoking the state's police power under the "implied
consent" statute is that the interests of society outweigh the rights of the
individual. The dangers imposed by the drinking driver to the vast number
of persons using the highways are such that they warrant a slight infringe-
ment upon the liberty of the individual. Thus, under the statute the right
of the many to use the highway without being endangered by intoxicated
drivers outweighs the privilege of the individual driver to refuse to submit
to a chemical test without fear of the sanctions contemplated by the
statute.
To call driving a privilege which is granted by the state and then con-
ditioning the grant merely clouds the issue. Whether a driving license is a
right or a privilege is only a matter of labelling. Since the automobile plays
such an important part in our social and economic lives, surely the oppor-
tunity to use it is "a liberty which under the fourteenth amendment can-
not be denied or curtailed by a state without due process of law."'42 The
constitutionality of conditioning the exercise of that right, privilege or
liberty-whatever it is called-ought to be basically the same as the con-
stitutionality of directly limiting that right, privilege or liberty under the
state's police powers.
appellee's premises the appellee could not reasonably be compelled to obtain a
motor vehicle license and renew it annually . . . . [Tihe fact that the veihcle occa-
sionally traversed the public highways and streets on special occasions and, by in-
ference, under special supervision, does not clearly bring it within the purview of the
Motor Vehicle License Act.
Id. at 296.
See also FLA. STAT. § 320.01(1) (1965) "Motor vehicle" includes automobiles, motor-
cycles, motor trucks, and all other vehicles operated over the public highways and streets of
this state . . . ." (emphasis added).
39. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227(b) (1964).
40. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
41. Olberding v. Illinois C. R.R., 346 U.S. 388 (1953).
[Tihere has been some fictive talk to the effect that the reason why a non-resident
can be subjected to a state's jurisdiction is that the non-resident has impliedly con-
sented to be sued there. In point of fact, however, jurisdiction in these cases does
not rest on consent at all . . . . The defendant may protest to high heaven his
unwillingness to be sued and it avails him not . . ..
Id. at 341.
42. Wall v. King, 206 F.2d 878, 882 (1st Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S.. 915 (1953).
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• . . of his breath, urine, or saliva for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content of his blood.
The underlying purpose for using chemical tests is their scientific re-
liability. 3 They provide a sound basis for determining whether or not a
motorist is intoxicated. Such evidence is superior to that based on observa-
tions and opinions by the police. Chemical tests take the guesswork out of
judging whether the driver is under the influence or not. They also serve
the double purpose of protecting the innocent as well as determining the
guilty.
Common criteria for determining drunkenness is often unreliable.
Without the use of chemical tests an investigating officer must make his
decision concerning the motorist's condition on what he observes-how
the driver handled the car, his general appearance and how he walked and
talked. This decision is even more difficult since the officer does not know
how the person is normally. Moreover, other conditions such as injury,
illness, medicine, extreme fatigue, or shock from the accident may produce
the appearance of being under the influence of intoxicating beverages. 44
Or the shock of the accident and the sight of a policeman may cause some
inebriated people to sufficiently "sober up" so as to conceal their real con-
dition, even though they were driving recklessly shortly before the
accident.
It is to be noted that the conscious45 driver does not "impliedly con-
sent" to a blood test, even though the use of the test has been held to be
constitutional. Generally, blood tests are believed to be the most reliable
of the various tests.4" However, in view of the sensitivities of many people
over having a blood test taken,47 it is desirable that the Florida statute
relies on other forms of testing.4 Since blood tests are valid under
stringent conditions, a good policy might be to allow the conscious driver
to take the blood test whenever he may desire it in order to clear himself
43. It does not follow, of course, that because a technique is scientifically reliable that
it can always be used to obtain evidence since there may be constitutional limitations. For
example, stomach pumps and hidden microphones produce reliable evidence but their re-
liability is immaterial if fundamental fairness or fourth amendment rights are violated.
44. For a work on chemical testing listing "pathological conditions having symptoms in
common with those of alcoholic influence" see DONIGAN, supra note 1, at Appendix IV, 300-07.
45. In a subsequent provision, Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, § 1, amending FLA STAT. §
322 (1965), persons who are unconscious will be deemed to have "impiedly consented" to
a blood test.
46. See Ladd and Gibson, supra note 28. For a discussion of the development of, and
the scientific basis for, the breath-testing technique see People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275,
282-90, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492, 499-506 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1954).
47. "We note that the physical and psychological disturbance of the individual involved
in obtaining a breath sample is apt to be significantly less than that involved in extracting
a blood sample . . . ." Justice Traynor in People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal.2d 543, 545, 421 P.2d
401,403, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, 395 (1966).
48. Other problems such as whether a person has a right to choose his own physician
to administer the blood test or must he "take" the physician chosen by the police are also
avoided. See Breslin v. Hults, 20 App. Div. 2d 790, 248 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
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in borderline cases. However, no doubt few people would be so willing.
Section (2)(g) of the statute would seem to give the driver this oppor-
tunity:
(g) Any person arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the
person was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcoholic bever-
ages may request the arresting officer to have a chemical test made of the
arrested person's breath, blood, saliva, or urine for the purpose of deter-
mining the alcoholic content of such person's blood, and, if so requested,
the arresting officer shall have the test performed.
Under this section the driver is entitled to have a chemical test taken
whenever he requests it. This takes care of the situation where police
officers might inadvertently or arbitrarily prejudice the rights of the
motorist by refusing to allow him to take a chemical test.49
Must a motorist be arrested before he is entitled to have a test taken
under section (g)? From the wording of the section it would appear that
arrest is a statutory prerequisite. However, in a Vermont case it was held
that the evidence provided by a driver who consented to the taking of
blood, without arrest, was admissible. 50 The court stated that,
[T]o make an arrest a prerequisite to admission of even a
voluntarily given blood test would require every driver sus-
pected of being under the influence to be put under arrest in
order to validate the very blood test that might establish that
prosecution was unwarranted. The law is not so unreasonable as
to deny him the right to avoid arrest by consenting to one of the
statutory tests.5 '
... if lawfully arrested for any offense allegedly committed while the per-
son was driving a motor vehicle under the influence of alcoholic bever-
ages. The test shall be incidental to a lawful arrest and ....
Before any of the three chemical tests can be performed an arrest
must be made by the police officer. This is based on the general proposi-
tion that a search of a person following his arrest is proper. The arrest
does not have to be for driving while intoxicated but can be for "any of-
fense allegedly committed" while the person is driving under the influ-
ence of alcohol.
Other implied consent statutes have the same requirement that an
arrest be made as a condition precedent to a test.52 Some statutes require
49. See Evans v. Municipal Court, 24 Cal. Rptr. 633 (2d Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
Whether the motorist has a right to choose which test he shall take will be discussed below.
50. State v. Auger, 124 Vt. 50, 196 A.2d 562 (1963).
51. Id. at 56, 196 A.2d at 566.
52. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (Supp. 1964) and N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIC
LAW § 1194(1) (1960). New York's original implied consent statute did not require that
the driver be placed under arrest. In Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116
(Sup. Ct. 1954) the statute was declared unconstitutional on the ground that the police
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that the test must be taken within two hours after the time of the arrest.53
Florida, however, has no statutory provision for a time limit within which
a chemical test must be made.
One problem that may arise is whether the officer has authority to ar-
rest in a situation, for example, where he arrives at the scene after the
accident has occurred. Since the offense of driving while under the in-
fluence is a misdemeanor 54 and an arrest for a misdemeanor can only be
made when it is committed in the officer's presence,55 it would appear that
if the officer has not seen the motorist driving, he cannot make an arrest
without first obtaining a search warrant."'
The argument on the side of the police for making a valid arrest
would be: (1) an exception to the requirement of a search warrant is
made when the evidence is apt to be destroyed, i.e., alcohol disappears
within the bloodstream; and, (2) a search can be made before an arrest if
reasonable grounds for making an arrest exist at the time of the search
and if the arrest is made within a reasonable time after the search. One
writer, as a way to solve this difficulty, has proposed that the authority of
the police be expanded to cover situations where there is reasonable
grounds to believe the motorist is driving while under the influence of
alcohol.5"
. . . administered at the direction of a police officer having reasonable
cause to believe such person was driving a motor vehicle within this state
while under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
The major problem presented by this provision is whether the police
officer or the motorist will make the choice as to which of the three tests
will be administered. If the motorist can choose which test he prefers,
must he be told of this choice?
officers under the statute could deprive a driver of the constitutional rights of due process.
The court stated that:
[Clonferring upon police officers the right to make a request under the guise of
authority concerning one's person without specific process and without lawful arrest
clearly amounts to an unlawful infringement upon one's liberty.
Id. at 52-53, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 127.
53. See N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1192(1) (McKinney 1960) and VA. CODE Ar.
§ 18-75.1 (Supp. 1960).
54. Where the place of the imprisonment is not specified in the statute and there is no
expression as to what class the offense is, or that the punishment is to be death or imprison-
ment in the state prison, then the offense is construed as a misdemeanor. Walden v. State,
50 Fla. 151, 39 So. 151 (1905) ; McDaniel v. Mayo, 79 So.2d 519 (Fla. 1955). The Florida
Statute providing for punishment for drunk driving does not state where the imprisonment
is to take place. See FLA. STAT. § 317.201 (1965).
55. FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1965). An officer who arrives at the scene could arrest for man-
slaughter if he has reasonable grounds to believe the felony has been committed.
56. Relying on this basis, an unsuccessful attack was made in Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc.
2d 491, 152 N.Y.S.2d 934, (Sup. Ct. 1956).
57. Weinstein, supra note 1, at 549-551. The Virginia statute has given this authority to
its officers. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-100 (Supp. 1960).
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From the wording of the statute it would seem that the motorist does
not have a choice since the test is to be "administered at the direction of
a police officer." Under the Kansas implied consent statute the argument
was made unsuccessfully that a driver should be given his choice of four
mentioned tests.58 The court stated:
We do not agree. In the first place, the statute says that the test
shall be administered at the direction of the arresting officer.
It is common knowledge that few areas in the state have the
technical equipment and facilities to administer all the tests. 59
To avoid any later attacks by the motorist and any disfavor with
the courts it would probably be best, since three tests are listed by the
statute, for the police to inform the driver that he has a choice, when
available, of three tests. Such a policy would be evidence that the police
acted reasonably. 0
Under the statute the police must have "reasonable cause to believe"
that the person is driving while intoxicated. Fourth amendment standards
as to what constitutes probable cause are certainly relevant. However, it
should be remembered that the Supreme Court in Schmerber stated that
there must be a "clear indication" that the driver is under the influence.6'
This will probably mean that a higher standard than that of "reasonable
cause" will be required.
Such person shall be told that his failure to submit to such a chemical test
will result in the suspension of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle for
a period of six months.
This apparently simple attempt to help the motorists gives rise to
several problems. 2 First, what constitutes a failure to submit? For ex-
ample, what about the situation where the motorist does not know whether
he should consent or refuse to take the test? He tells the officer that he
will take the test if his attorney advises him to, but the officer refuses
to allow the motorist the opportunity to telephone his attorney. Has the
motorist "refused" to take the test?
The New York Court of Appeals faced this question in a situation
dealing with whether the motorist's license should be revoked for failure
58. Lee v. State, 87 Kan. 556, 358 P.2d 765 (1961).
59. Id. at 571, 358 P.2d at 769. Accord, Timm v. State, 110 N.W.2d 359 (N.D. 1961).
Contra, Ringwood v. State, 8 Utah 2d 287, 333 P.2d 943 (1959). In Ringwood the court
held that the arresting officer had not complied with the requirements of the statute when
he confronted the accused with the choice of submitting to a blood test only, or of having
his license revoked.
60. In talking about whether the withdrawal of blood was a violation of due process,
the Supreme Court in Schmerber said:
It would be a different case if the police initiated the violence, refused to respect
a reasonable request to undergo a different form of testing, or responded to resist-
ance with inappropriate force. 384 U.S. 757, 760 n.4 (1966).
61. Id. at 770.
62. See Annot., 88 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1963).
COMMENT
to submit to the test and stated that the "constitutional rights of petitioner
were not invaded because of the refusal of his request for counsel.""3
In a concurring opinion Judge Van Voorhis stated that the motorist was
"entitled if he could have done so promptly, to consult with his lawyer
about the bearing which the test might have upon his possible conviction
under the criminal charge." 4 However, such a right, he said, is limited
to a criminal proceeding and does not apply to a proceeding concerned
with the revocation of a license. 6
Another condition which the motorist might impose is that a physi-
cian of his own choosing administer the test or be present. This usually
has been held to constitute a refusal. 66
A refusal must be distinguished from an inability to take a test. In
In re Scott67 the issue was whether there was substantial evidence to sup-
port the revocation of the petitioner's license on the ground that he "re-
fused" to take a breathalyzer test. The petitioner had taken two other tests
and apparently passed them. He testified that he had tried to blow into
the balloon but that his false teeth kept getting in his way, that they
"came down" and cut off his breath. The court said:
[I]t must be remembered that refusal differs and may be dis-
tinguished from "inability," especially when the good faith of
the petitioner does not seem to have been questioned. Indeed
obedience in taking the coin and sobriety tests as directed could
seem to negative any question of bad faith. The evidence, in our
opinion, does not support the conclusion that petitioner refused
to submit to such test ... "
Second, must a motorist be told that he has a right to refuse to take
the test under the statute? The statute reads that only upon a refusal to
take the test must the driver be so informed of the consequences and it
leaves up in the air whether he must be advised of his rights at the time
the request for the test is made. The arguments that will be made for not
informing the motorist of his rights are: (1) the driver has impliedly
consented to take the test; and (2) the driver is presumed to know the
law.
6 9
Although the state can compel a driver to undergo chemical tests
under certain circumstances, where the state has provided an alternative
to such tests, it would seem that under the spirit of recent Supreme Court
63. Finocchairo v. Kelly, 11 N.Y.2d 58, 59, 181 N.E.2d 427, 428, 226 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962),
cert. denied, 370 U.S. 912 (1962).
64. Id. at 61, 181 N.E.2d at 429, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 405.
65. Id. at 62, 181 N.E.2d at 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 406.
66. Breslin v. Hults, 20 App. Div. 2d 790, 248 N.Y.S.2d 70 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Sowa v.
Hults, 22 App. Div. 2d 730, 253 N.Y.S.2d 294 (Sup Ct. 1964).
67. 5 App. Div 2d 859,171 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1958).
68. Id. at 859, 171 N.Y.S.2d at 211.
69. Schutt v. MacDuff, 205 Misc. 43, 127 N.Y.S.2d 116 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
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decisions, such as Miranda, the driver should be told of his rights. If
under the "implied consent" statute the motorist "impliedly" waives his
privilege against self-incrimination, then to have an intelligent waiver, the
motorist must actually know of his rights. If a motorist does not actually
know of an alternative, then his rights under the statute are meaningless
since most people in such a situation will submit to the authority of the
police.
[I]t is clear that everyone except possibly a hardened criminal
or a very wise man would be under the feeling of some duress
when any demand is made upon him by an officer of the law,
especially if the officer is badged and armed. The feeling is
natural and proper, and this court would not want it otherwise,
for there must be respect for the authority of police officers.7
Unfortunately, this provision of the Florida statute does not mention
anything about what information a motorist is to receive prior to the de-
mand upon him to submit to the test.71 Although the fact that the statute
does not expressly require a warning probably does not violate due
process,72 hopefully the practice of the police will be to inform the motor-
ist of his right of refusal and the effect of his refusal with respect to the
possible suspension of his driver's license before they request that the
driver submit to a test."3
Third, can evidence of a refusal to take the test be admitted into
evidence or be commented upon at trial? The decisions on this point are
not in full agreement.74 In a recent decision by the District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, the petitioner was told he had a right not to take
the breath analysis test. 75 He refused the test and this fact was brought
out at the trial. Basing its opinion on a footnote in Schmerber which
states that if the accused incriminates himself when faced with the pros-
pect of taking a test, the testimony may be a by-product of compulsion
70. Id. at 54, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 128 (1954).
71. A good argument could be made that this provision when read together with section
(d) requires a warning. Section (d) lists the issues to be decided at a hearing for a driver's
license:
For the purpose of this section, the question of whether such person lawfully
refused to take a chemical test as provided for by this law and the issues determin-
ative shall be . . . (4) Whether . . . [the person] had been told that his driving
privilege would be suspended if he refused to submit to such a test.
The argument would be that such a person could not "lawfully" refuse unless he had
been told about the suspension. The "if" in sentence (4) should be interpreted to mean
"upon the condition that", rather then "when" or "after." Thus the meaning of the
sentence would be whether such person had been told that upon the condition that he re-
fused to submit to such a test, that his driving privilege would be suspended.
72. Anderson v. MacDuff, 208 Misc. 271, 143 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
73. In People v. Ward, 307 N.Y. 73; 78, 120 N.E.2d 211,'214 (1954) the Court of Ap-
peals said, "[Ilt is undoubtedly the better practice for the police to notify the person of
his rights ...
74. See Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 370 (1963).
75. Gay v..Orlando, 202 So.2d 896 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
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and therefore inadmissible,78 the court held that evidence of the peti-
tioner's refusal to submit to the breathalyzer test was a testimonial
by-product that falls within the privilege of self-incrimination:
In the case before us petitioner was confronted with a
choice of either voluntarily submitting to the test or refusing
and thereby making a self-incriminating statement. While the
results of a properly administered breathalyzer test are not
within the privilege, self-incriminating testimonial by-products
are ...
Thus we agree with petitioner that evidence of his refusal
to take a breathalyzer test is inadmissible.
7
Will a court reach the same result under the implied consent statute?
Some statutes specifically provide that evidence shall not be admissible, 7
but most are silent on the matter. In a recent opinion by the California
Supreme Court, which held that the prosecution's comment on the de-
fendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer test was admissible, Justice
Traynor stated:
[T]he disparate results found in other jurisdictions may be
ascribed to the presence of an underlying constitutional or stat-
utory right to refuse to produce the physical evidence sought.
States that recognize a right to refuse to take such tests exclude
evidence of refusal. States that recognize no right to refuse allow
testimony and comment on the refusal. (Footnotes omitted)
79
(b) Any such person who is incapable of refusal by reason of uncon-
sciousness or other mental or physical condition shall be deemed not to
have withdrawn his consent to any such test. Any such person whose con-
sent is implied as hereinabove provided and who, during the period within
which a test prescribed herein can be reasonably administered, or who
being admitted to a hospital as a result o1 his involvement as a driver in
a motor vehicle accident, is so incapacitated as to render impractical or
impossible the administration of any of the aforesaid tests of breath,
urine, or saliva, shall be deemed to have consented also to an approved
blood test given as provided herein and shall be deemed not to have with-
drawn his consent therefor ...
This is a rather laborious way to say that the state may give a blood
test to a person who is unconscious. It is a power the state already had
before the enactment of the statute.80 The fact that the statute talks of
76. 384 U.S. 757, 765 n.9 (1966).
77. Gay v. Orlando, 202 So.2d 896, 898 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1967).
78. E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55 (Supp. 1960).
79. People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393 (1967). Justice
Traynor did note that in those states that recognize a right to refuse a chemical test there
is not unanimous agreement on the exclusion of the evidence of a refusal. See State v. Bock,
80 Idaho 296, 328 P.2d 1065 (1958).
80. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). The Court in Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757,
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consent not being withdrawn merely muddies the water further as the real
basis of the state's power to give such a test is in its police powers, not in
any consent being fictitiously "implied" or "not withdrawn." Since the
withdrawal of blood from an unconscious person does not violate notions
of due process, the state may properly administer a blood test under cer-
tain conditions. One of the main reasons for "implying consent" in ad-
vance, however, is to avoid the "consent" problem with particular empha-
sis on the motorist who is rendered insensible or unconscious from an
accident. Most authorities, regardless of the deprivation of privacy, have
held that where the motorist is unconscious, although in actuality he
neither consents nor refuses, the evidence obtained from a test is admis-
sible unless there is a statutory prohibition or a constitutional objection.8'
Certain construction difficulties arise from the language of this sec-
tion which will only provide defense attorneys grounds for attack. What
constitutes "being incapable of refusal by reason of unconsciousness or
other mental or physical condition?" For example, does a person who is
conscious when he enters the hospital but after an hour or two becomes
unconscious achieve this status?82 Could not the person argue that a non-
blood type test should have been taken when he was conscious?
When is the period during which a test can be reasonably adminis-
tered? Some statutes require that the test be taken within two hours after
the arrest.83 Would a period longer than this be unreasonable? Since the
reliability of blood tests decreases the longer the time for the test is de-
layed, there is always a reasonable time in which the test must be taken
anyway.
What does it mean that the driver is "so incapacitated as to render
impractical or impossible" the breath, urine or saliva tests? Would not
the saliva test nearly always be practical?
The second sentence, because it is in the disjunctive, gives the im-
pression that a blood test can be taken outside a hospital. However, sec-
760 n.4, in comparing the circumstances with Breithaupt effectively used a dissenting opinion
by Justice Warren in Breithaupt in which he found no distinction between a blood test
taken when a person is conscious and one taken when a person is unconscious: "[We] can-
not see that it should make any difference whether one states unequivocally that he objects
or resorts to physical violence in protest or is in such condition that he is unable to protest."
Warren C.J., dissenting in Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 441 (1957).
81. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); People v. Haeussler, 41 Cal. 2d 252,
260 P.2d 8 (1953) (the test results were admitted in evidence and the California Supreme
Court held that this procedure did not violate either the privilege against self-incrimination
or the right to due process).
82. See, e.g., State v. Ball, 179 A.2d 466 (1962) where the doctor said he found the
motorist conscious at the scene of the accident and conscious at the hospital, although he
would lapse into a deep sleep.
83. See N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney 1960); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 18.1-55 (Supp. 1960).
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tion (2) (b) states that "withdrawal of blood shall be performed only at
a hospital, clinic, or other medical facility." 4
Must an arrest be made in the case of an unconscious person before
a test can be taken? The statute says nothing on this point. The require-
ment would seem somewhat formalistic since the motorist is unaware that
he is being taken into the custody of the police. In a California case the
requirement of arrest was met when the officer "mentally" placed the
motorist under arrest for driving while under the influence of intoxicating
beverages.8 5
A final question is must the blood test of the unconscious motorist be
made at the request of a police officer or could it be made, for example,
at the request of another driver who might want the results of the test for
a personal injury case. Although the statute is silent on this matter, prob-
ably only a police officer can request the test since he is the only person
named who can administer the test in the case of a conscious person."
Although a driver's "implied consent" to a blood test is presumed
not to be withdrawn under the statute because of unconsciousness, 7 it
must be remembered that courts may arrive at various interpretations as
to whether the requisite consent, implied or actual, has been given. For
example, a Vermont court held that under its implied consent statute:
Consent to the taking of any of the permitted tests is re-
quired to be real, for the respondent has the privilege of choice.
Nowhere does the statute substitute an implication for an ex-
pressed consent to a test.8
A court might feel that the withdrawal of blood from an unconscious
driver constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure.8 9 The argument
might be made that the driver's intoxicated condition rendered him in-
84. FLA. LAWS 1967, ch. 67-308, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 322 (1965). Query: Is an
ambulance a medical facility? See also the Supreme Court's comment in Schmerber, 384 U.S.
at 771: "Petitioner's blood was taken by a physician in a hospital environment according to
accepted medical practices.
85. People v. Lane, 49 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Cal. 2d Dist. 1966).
86. Section (e) would also lend support to this. In dealing with the non-liability of a
physician administering a blood test, it states that the physician is not liable if the test was
proper and the physician was requested in writing by a peace officer to administer a blood
test. From this it could be implied that only a police officer can make the request.
87. However, under the North Dakota implied consent statute, N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 39-20-01 (1965), "any person who is dead, unconscious or who is otherwise in a condition
rendering him incapable of refusal, shall be deemed to have withdrawn his consent . .. ."
88. State v. Ball, 123 Vt. 26, 30, 179 A.2d 466, 469 (1962). But see State v. Bock, 80
Idaho 296, 308, 328 P.2d 1065, 1072 (1958) where the court reasoned that "by operating a
motor vehicle in this state the defendant is deemed to have given his consent to a chemical
test." The only way he can withdraw that consent is to expressly refuse the test. Hence,
under Idaho law if the person neither refuses nor consents expressly, the test may be made.
89. Lebel v. Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 440, 93 N.W.2d 281, 287 (1958) (not decided
under an "implied consent" statute, however).
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capable of legally "consenting" to a chemical test, since he was not in
sufficient possession of his senses to know what he was doing.90 A court
may feel that in some cases where the motorist is unconscious, the police
did not have "reasonable cause." For example, the police were not able
to question the motorist, witnesses were not available, or an extended in-
vestigation was not made. Or finally a court may feel that the withdraw-
ing of blood from an unconscious person may be especially undesirable
since needed medical attention may be diverted and the law should not
encourage such a diversion.91
Under the foregoing circumstances of this subsection, such tests, inclusive
of said blood test, may be administered whether or not such person is
told that his failure to submit to such blood test will result in the suspen-
sion of his privilege to operate a motor vehicle upon the public highways
of this state.
This section seems somewhat absurd since an unconscious person
can not refuse or be told anything. It merely reiterates the idea in section
(a) that the motorist must refuse to take the test before he is told of
his rights rather than be told of his right of refusal before the demand
for the test is made.
A much fairer procedure would be to inform the unconscious person
after he regains consciousness of his rights and at that time give him a
choice between having the evidence used against him or of having his
license suspended.
2
The use of the phrase "public highways of this state" should be
noted. This gives support to the argument that the statute was designed to
cover only public roads, and not all roads within the state.
Sections (c), (d), (e) and (f) deal with matters of procedure con-
cerning the suspension of the motorist's license upon his failure to take
the test. The sections are generally self-explanatory and should present
90. The argument which at first glance seems absurd has been made, but unsuccessfully,
in Wells v. State, 239 Ind. 415, 158 N.E.2d 256 (1959), and in Jones v. State, 159 Tex.
Crim. 29, 261 S.W.2d 161 (1953) where it was said:
[A] person under the influence of intoxicating liquor, as defined by the penal
code, need not be so intoxicated as to be incapable of entering into a valid agree-
ment, and yet be sufficiently intoxicated to come within the statute . . . defining
driving on a public highway while intoxicated.
Id. at 31, 261 S.W.2d at 162.
91. See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law-Analysis of Blood Extracted
Without Warrant From Unconscious Suspect is Admissible in Criminal Trial, 79 HAmv. L.
REv. 677, 681 (1966). See also Giddons v. Cannon, 193 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967). Al-
though the court in Giddons did not mention anything about medical attention being di-
verted, blood transfusions were begun on the unconscious motorist at 4:15 A.M. and at
about 5:00 A.M. a blood sample was withdrawn for analysis. Id. at 454.
92. In State v. Tripp, 158 Me. 161, 180 A.2d 601 (1962) the court found a valid con-
sent because the motorist consented to the test. after he gained consciousness and after he
was informed of his rights.
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few difficulties. The problems involved will be concerned with the con-
struction of the statute rather than with its validity.
Section (c) says that upon the motorist's refusal and a sworn state-
ment by the officer that he had "reasonable cause to believe" that the
motorist was under the influence, the motorist's privilege to operate a
motor vehicle shall be suspended for six months. The suspension, how-
ever, is not automatic. Unless the person invokes his rights under section
(d), the suspension is not effective until ten days after he has received
notice of the suspension from the department of public safety.
In section (d) the motorist is given a right to a hearing. There can
be no revocation of a license until the motorist has an opportunity to be
heard. The department of public safety must immediately notify the mo-
torist in writing of: (1) the suspension; (2) his right to petition for a
hearing; and, (3) his right to be represented at the hearing by counsel.
The petition for the hearing must be filed in "the court having trial juris-
diction of the criminal offense for which (the motorist) shall stand
charged." It must be filed within ten days after the motorist has received
notice of suspension. The court shall set a hearing within twenty days
after the filing of the petition. At the hearing the following issues shall be
decided:
(1) Whether the arresting peace officer had reasonable cause to believe
the person had been driving a motor vehicle in this state while under the
influence of alcoholic beverage.
Since the motorist has refused to take a chemical test, evidence of the
motorist's intoxicated condition must be based on observations made by
the police. These observations will usually be of the motorist's voice,
speech, eyes, breath, and gait. Such evidence has been held to be suffi-
cient to meet the "preliminary statutory requirement for the request by
the arresting officer that a test for alcohol be taken by the driver . . .93
It should also be remembered that the fact that a motorist may be ac-
quitted of a criminal charge of driving while intoxicated does not pre-
clude an administrative hearing revoking the motorist's license for
refusing to submit to a chemical test.94
The remaining issues to be decided at the hearing are:
(2) Whether the person was placed under lawful arrest?
(3) Whether he refused to submit to the test after being requested by a
peace officer?
93. Clancy v. Kelly, 7 App. Div. 2d 820, 822, 180 N.Y.S.2d 923, 924 (1958). See also
Donlick v. Hults, 13 App. Div. 2d 879, 215 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1961).
94. Prucha v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 172 Neb. 415, 110 N.W.2d 75 (1961)
(acquittal of a criminal charge of driving under the influence of alcoholic beverages does not
have any bearing upon a proceeding before the director). Combes v. Kelly, 2 Misc. 2d 491,
152 N.Y.S.2d 934 (Sup. Ct. 1956) (in the criminal trial the petitioner was presumed to be
innocent and the hearing is a separate and distinct legal proceeding).
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(4) Whether, except for the person described in subparagraph (b) above,
he had been told that his driving privilege would be suspended if he re-
fused to submit to such test?
Section (e) says that the filing of the motorist's petition shall delay
the suspension of the license until the hearing, which must be held within
20 days of the filing. If the trial court does not hold the hearing within
20 days, the suspension shall not take place until the motorist has been
granted a hearing. This provision avoids the problem of whether suspen-
sion may occur before the hearing." If the motorist requests a continu-
ance, however, then the suspension can occur before the hearing.
Section (f) says that if the suspension is sustained at the hearing
then the motorist's driving privilege shall be immediately suspended and
the driving license surrendered.
Section (g), stating that the motorist is entitled upon request to a
test, has been previously covered.
(h) Warning of the consent provision of this section shall be printed
above the signature line on each new or renewed driver's license issued
after the effective date of this act.
(i) By applying for a driver's license and by accepting and using a
driver's license, the person holding the driver's license shall be deemed
to have expressed his consent to the provisions of this section.
These sections carry the fiction of "implied consent" to a ridiculous
extreme. No conceivable good can come from them. Their only function
will be to provide extra ammunition for defense attorneys to attack pro-
ceedings for suspension of drivers' licenses.
The question in section (h) is what will be the result if the section
is not followed? For instance, will the "implied consent" statute apply
if the department of public safety by mistake does not print the "con-
sent provision" on the driver's license? What if it is printed, but it is
illegible? What if it is printed below the line? What if the motorist upon
receiving his license scratches the provision out? Many questions of this
sort, which should never arise in the first place, can easily come to mind.
The same questions arise with section (i). Do the "consent provi-
sions" apply to a person who does not apply for a license? How about the
person who has his license suspended? Most likely a court when faced
with these questions will say that even though sections (h) and (i) are
not applicable because they have not been followed, the "implied con-
sent" statute is still applicable through the operation of other sections of
the statute.9"
95. See In re Grimshaw, 7 Misc. 2d 218, 165 N.Y.S.2d 263 (Sup. Ct. 1957).
96. E.g., subsection (1) (a) of § 322.261:. "Any person who shall accept the privilege...
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If consent is what is desired in the licensing procedure, then it would
be a simple matter to have the motorist consent in writing in order to
obtain his driver's license.
(2) (a) The test determining the weight of alcohol in the defendant's
blood shall be administered at the direction of the arresting officer in
accordance with rules and regulations which shall have been adopted by
the department. Such rules and regulations shall have been adopted after
public hearing, and shall specify precisely the test or tests which are ap-
proved by said department for reliability of result and facility and ad-
ministration and shall provide an approved method of administration
which shall be followed in all tests given under this section.7
This section reinforces the idea that the police and not the motorist
shall select the test to be administered. If the choice of the test can be
made by the motorist, he could easily avoid the statute by choosing a
test which was not approved of by the department.
Under this section, in order for the police to take advantage of the
statute, a hearing will have to be held and rules and regulations will have
to be adopted by the department of public safety afterward. Of course,
the rules and regulations will have to be followed or defense attorneys will
have a basis for further quibbling under the statute.
(b) Only a physician, registered nurse, or duly licensed clinical laboratory
technologist or clinical laboratory technician acting at the request of a
peace officer may withdraw blood for the purpose of determining the
alcoholic content therein. Such withdrawal of blood shall be performed
only at a hospital, clinic, or other medical facility. This limiation shall not
apply to the taking of breath, urine, or saliva specimens.
This section is in harmony with the policy of Schmerber which
stated that a blood test could be justified only under stringently limited
conditions. Since a blood test requires a physical entry into the body, for
health reasons and because of personal sensibilities, the test must be made
by a qualified person in a medical atmosphere. The section is practical in
that the taking of a blood test is not limited solely to a physician, but
can be made by other qualified personnel. 8
shall by so operating such vehicle be deemed to have given his consent . . ." This would
take care of the "consent provision" being absent on the driver's license.
97. Section (j) has been previously discussed.
98. Query: Can an intern, who is often in charge of emergency rooms in hospitals,
withdraw blood under the statute? Is he a "physician" under the statute for the purpose
of withdrawing blood. In People v. Stanton, 33 Misc. 2d 921, 228 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Erie County
Ct. 1962) the court held that an intern is a "physician" for the purpose of the statute. In
Murphy v. New York State Thruway Authority, 23 Misc. 2d 1078, 204 N.Y.S.2d 953 (Ct.
Cl. 1960) an undertaker, at a state trooper's request, took a blood sample from the body
of a deceased motorist. The evidence was held inadmissible.
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(c) The person tested may at his own expense have a physician, registered
nurse, duly licensed clinical laboratory technologist or clinical laboratory
technician or any other person of his own choosing administer a test, in
addition to the one administered at the direction of a peace officer, for
the purpose of determining the amount of alcohol in his blood at the time
alleged as shown by chemical analysis of his blood, breath, or urine. The
failure or inability to obtain an additional test by a person shall not pre-
clude the admissibility in evidence of the test taken at the direction of a
peace officer.
This section covers the situation where the motorist is under arrest.
If the motorist is not arrested or is released, he, of course, always has the
right to go to a doctor to have a chemical test taken. While under arrest,
in order to make the right meaningful the motorist must be given a reason-
able opportunity to contact a doctor. 9 This should usually mean no more
than a phone call.
The main issue which arises is whether the motorist must be in-
formed of his rights to an additional test. In facing this issue a New York
court said:
Defendant urges that the statute is unconstitutional by reason
of the failure to provide a provision for notice to a defendant of
his right to have a physician of his own choosing administer a
a chemical test in addition to one by police. No authorities in
support of this contention are submitted. This statute does not
require that any notice be given a defendant as to this right.
It would seem that it is sufficient to say that all persons are pre-
sumed to know the law and are therefore presumed to be so in-
formed as to this right. They should acquaint themselves at
least with those laws most likely to affect their usual activities.
The point is without merit.100
Yet, if the motorist has this right to an additional test, why should
it be kept under a blanket? If the right is important enough the motorist
should be told about it. Under the Connecticut statute the motorist must
be immediately informed of his right to have an additional chemical test
performed.10'
Another problem is what is meant by an "additional test?" For ex-
ample, if a blood or urine specimen is obtained from the motorist does
he have the right to obtain part of the specimen so as to obtain an addi-
tional, independent test, or must he have another blood or urine specimen
99. See CONN. GEN'. STAT. ANN. § 14-227b (Supp. 1964), which says that the defendant
shall have a "reasonable opportunity" to exercise his right to have an additional chemical test
performed.
100. People v. Kovacik, 205 Misc. 275, 292, 128 N.Y.S.2d 492, 508-9 (Ct. Special Sess.
of N.Y. City 1954).
101. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANtN. § 14-227b (1964).
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taken from him by his own doctor? It is to the motorist's advantage to
have an independent test made since a variance in the results of the two
tests made of identical samples could always occur.10 2 The Virginia statute
attempts to solve this problem by requiring the physician withdrawing
the blood to place the specimen in two separate containers. One container
is delivered to the state and the other to the motorist, who can obtain a
separate analysis if he so desires.
If "additional test" means, as it appears under the Florida statute,
that another specimen must be obtained from the motorist, then the re-
sults of the two tests will be different since the "test" obtained by the
motorist will have been performed at a later time. The state can claim
that the "additional test" is unreliable since in the time between the two
tests the alcohol has had a chance to oxidize and the motorist to "sober
up.
Another question is whether the motorist can have an additional test
taken of his saliva? The provision lists only blood, breath or urine and
does not expressly exclude saliva. Perhaps the reason for omitting the
saliva test is that it was feared that before the second test the motorist
would rinse his mouth out so as to reduce the amount of alcohol.
The burden is upon the motorist to obtain a physician. The police
under the statute are not obligated to obtain one. Furthermore, the police
do not have to postpone their test until the motorist's physician arrives
because the test afforded here is an additional test. If the motorist is
given a reasonable opportunity to get his own physician but is unable to
for one reason or another, then the motorist has failed in his burden and
the original test is not made inadmissible.
(d) Upon the request of the person tested, full information concerning
the test taken at the direction of the peace officer shall be made available
to him or his attorney.
This section entitles the motorist to know the evidence which can be
used against him at the trial. The burden, however, is on the motorist
since he does not have to be informed that he has a right to the results of
the test, and no doubt the courts will echo the refrain that the motorist is
presumed to know the law.
But even if the motorist does know that he can obtain the results
why should he be put to the trouble and expense of having to get the re-
sults himself? The statute does not even say from whom the motorist is
to obtain the results. Is it the local police who have arrested him, the
department of public safety, the state attorney's office, or the court in
which he will be tried? In order to avoid red tape and to decide how he is
going to plead, the motorist ought to be informed of the test results as
102. See Ladd & Gibson, supra note 28, at 194-8 and 207.
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soon as they are available. If the test is a breath test taken at the scene
of the accident, the motorist should be given the results, favorable or un-
favorable, at that time so that he can decide whether he wants to have
another test adminstered by his own doctor. If the test requires laboratory
analysis, then the results should be mailed to the motorist when they are
available. Such procedures are a minimum burden upon the state. In this
respect the Connecticut statute is particularly exemplary. It states that a
true copy of the report of the test result must be mailed to the motorist
within twenty-four hours after the result is known in order for the evid-
ence to be admissible.
(e) No physician, registered nurse, or duly licensed clinical laboratory
technologist or clinical laboratory technician shall incur any civil or
criminal liability as a result of the proper administering of a blood test
when requested in writing by a peace officer to administer such a test.
This provision is salutary in that it ought to ensure the cooperation
of the doctors and other qualified personnel administering the blood test.
Otherwise, doctors would be apprehensive in performing the test for fear
of possible suits for malpractice or the tort of assault. However, to be im-
mune from liability, the test must be administered "properly." Thus, a
physician might still be liable if he were negligent in administering the
test. Since the withdrawal of blood is a fairly simple procedure medically,
the likelihood of this contingency occurring is not very great.
The fact that the request is to be made in writing seems unnecessary.
There seems to be no reason why an oral request should not be just as
effective." 3 If the request is not in writing, does this mean that the physi-
cian may be liable? Or can the "request in writing" requirement be in-
terpreted as a requirement imposed upon the police?
Another question left unanswered by this provision is whether the
hospital can be sued for the acts of its physicians or other employees in
making the blood test. If the purpose of the provision is to ensure the
cooperation of physicians, then it is best carried out by making all persons
who took part in the test, including the hospital, immune from liability. In
this respect the New York statute is noteworthy:
No physician, registered professional nurse or hospital employ-
ing such physician or registered professional nurse, and no other
employer of such physician or registered professional nurse shall
be sued or held liable for any act done or omitted in the course
of withdrawing blood at the request of a police officer .... ."",
The remedy for the motorist upon whom an improper blood test has
been made should be in an action against the state.
103. N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIC LAW § 1194(1) (McKinney 1960), says that a physician
shall not be liable for the act of withdrawing blood done "at the request of a police officer."
104. Id.
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(f) If the test given under subsection (1) is a chemical test of urine, the
person tested shall be given such privacy in the taking of the urine speci-
men as will insure the accuracy of the specimen and, at the same time,
maintain the dignity of the individual involved.
Since under the law the police must act reasonably and follow the
requisites of due process, this provision does not appear to add anything
new. Difficulty, of course will be encountered in ascertaining what is
meant by privacy that will "insure the accuracy of the specimen and, at
the same time, maintain the dignity of the individual involved." Such a
concept requires a unique balancing test. For conduct that is extreme the
answer will be obvious. Less than extreme conduct, however, will give
interpretive problems as to what is meant by such privacy.
B. Presumption of Intoxication, Testing Methods
10 5
(2)101 Upon the trial of any civil or criminal action or proceeding arising
out of acts alleged to have been committed by any person while driving
or in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of al-
coholic beverages when affected to the extent that his normal faculties
were impaired, the results of any test administered in accordance with
this act shall be admissable [sic] into evidence where otherwise admis-
sable [sic], and the amount of alcohol in the person's blood at the time
alleged as shown by chemical analysis of the person's blood, urine, breath,
or other bodily substance shall give rise to the following presumptions:
It should be noticed that the results of blood tests can be used in both
criminal and civil proceedings. If the statutory standards of evidence are
useful in driving while intoxicated cases, there seems to be no reason to
limit their application to only this particular proceeding.
10 7
An example of where test results were used in a civil action is a recent
Florida case in the District Court of Appeal, Second District.10 8 In an
action for personal injuries sustained in a rear-end automobile collision
the issue was whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in that he
was intoxicated at the time of the accident. On appeal, the court in citing
and following Schmerber held that the evidence was admissible.
When the statute states that the amount of alcohol at the "time al-
leged" should give rise to certain presumptions, it refers to the time of the
105. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. § 322 (1965).
106. Section (1) is omitted since it merely reiterates FLA. STAT. § 317.201 (1965)
making it punishable to drive under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
107. See Williams v. Hendrickson, 189 Kan. 673, 371 P.2d 188 (1962). A case, however,
which limited the application of the tests because of the specific language of the chemical
test statute was Hoffman v. State, 160 Neb. 375, 70 N.W.2d 314 (1955) where the statute
was applicable only to driving while intoxicated, not motor vehicle homicide. See generally
Donigan, supra note 1, at 27-9.
108. Giddens v. Cannon, 193 So.2d 453 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1967).
1968]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [VOL. XXII
civil or criminal act. However, the test results will show the amount of
alcohol present at the time when the test is made, which may be as much
as two or three hours after the "acts alleged." In order to determine the
percentage of alcohol present in a person's blood at the time of the ac-
cident, the process of extrapolation must be used. Since alcohol disappears
from the blood stream at a known rate,10 9 experts in their testimony can
accurately estimate what the percentage of alcohol in the driver was at
the time of the accident.
It is unfortunate that the term "other bodily substance" was used in
enumerating the kinds of chemical tests which can be used since the
enumeration in this provision is inconsistent with other provisions of the
statute which lists breath, urine or saliva and blood in the case of an un-
conscious person." 0 The question then becomes whether tests of "other
bodily substances" such as spinal fluid, or whatever else comes to the
imagination, are permissible. Under a principle of statutory construction
the answer would appear to be no. The rule of ejusdem generis"' would
construe the general term, "bodily substances," to be of the same kind as
the specifically mentioned substances, namely blood, urine, breath or
saliva.
(a) If there was at that time 0.05 per cent or less by weight of alcohol in
the person's blood, it shall be presumed that the person was not under the
influence of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties
were impaired.
(b) If there was at that time in excess of 0.05 per cent but less than 0.10
per cent by weight of alcohol in the person's blood, such fact shall not give
rise to any presumption that the person was or was not under the influence
of alcoholic beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were im-
paired, but such fact may be considered with other competent evidence
in determining whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic
beverages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.
(c) If there was at that time more than 0.10 per cent by weight of alcohol
in the person's blood, it shall be prima facie evidence that his normal
faculties were impaired.
109. Generally no more than .02 per cent an hour.
110. Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, § 1, amending FLA. STAT. § 322 (1965). However, see
Fla. Laws 1967, ch. 67-308, § 2, amending FLA. STAT. § 322 (1965) where the term "other
bodily substances" is also used.
111. "In the construction of laws, wills and other instruments the 'ejusdem generis
rule' is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of
a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest
extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or
class as those specifically mentioned. The rule, however, does not necessarily require that
the general provision be limited in its scope to the identical things specifically named. Nor
does it apply when the context manifests a contrary intention." (citations omitted) BLACK'S
LAW DICTioNARY 608 (4th ed. 19S1).
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The value of the presumptions is that they make it technically un-
necessary for an expert witness to give interpretive testimony as to the
consequences of various levels of alcohol in the blood.112 The findings and
knowledge of scientists and medical experts have been incorporated in the
Florida statute in the form of legal presumptions."'
Where no statutory presumptions exist a qualified expert must ex-
plain to the jury the meaning of the different degrees of blood alcohol
levels, their various effects on a motorist's faculties, and the interpreta-
tion of the results of the chemical tests.
Under the Florida Statute these presumptions are applicable to any
type of civil or criminal proceeding" 4 and their constitutional validity
seems to be settled. The provision that a high blood alcohol content is to
be taken as presumptive of intoxication has been upheld against the con-
tention that it establishes an unconstitutional presumption of guilt." 5
The reason is that the alcoholic content of the blood has a strong, rational
connection with the fact of intoxication.
.The statutory presumptive level is not a single arbitrary line, with a
person on one side being under the influence of intoxicating liquor and a
person on the other side being sober. Rather, two limiting figures of blood
alcohol concentration are established. There is a low level, 0.05 per cent,
below which practically no one would be affected, and a second level, 0.10
per cent, considerably higher than the first, above which all drivers are
under the influence. In between is a zone in which no presumption is
created. In this zone some persons may be under the influence and others
may not be. As the percentage increases toward 0.10 per cent a greater
number will become under the influence. Thus the two levels protect a
person who carries his liquor better than others. They also provide a safe-
guard against errors of interpretation.
112. However, nothing in the statute prevents the introduction of expert interpretative
testimony as would be necessary in the absence of the statute.
113. The stated presumption, that if at least 0.15 per cent of alcohol is present
in the blood the subject is under the influence of intoxicating liquor for the pur-
poses of operation of a motor vehicle, recognizes the universally accepted truth that
such is physiologically the case with respect to every person, regardless of the
extent of usual external manifestations, individual tolerance for alcohol or pre-
existing individual physical conditions or idiosyncracies. . . .The experts testifying
at the Senate hearing stated that in thousands of tests conducted over the years, no
one has ever been found with that quantity of alcohol in his blood who was not so
seriously impaired in his faculties, irrespective of external manifestations, that he
should not operate a motor vehicle. Indeed, the scientific conclusion has now been
reached that the level is attained when the percentage is only 0.10 and the revised
Uniform Vehicle Code § 11-902 (b) (3) (1962) declares that the presumption shall
come into operation at that figure.
State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 153, 199 A.2d 809, 822 (1964).
114. This is because of the broad language used in § 322.262 (2): "Upon the trial of
any civil or criminal action ...the results of any test ...shall give rise to the following
presumptions."
115. The leading case is-State v. Childress, 78 Ariz. 1, 274 P.2d 333 (1954). See Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 1176 (1956).
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Many statutes, especially the early ones, established a presumptive
level of intoxication at 0.15 per cent. Lately, however, as a result of new
research, states have reduced the presumptive level for being under the
influence from 0.15 per cent to 0.10 per cent, or have enacted statutes,
such as Florida has, establishing the 0.10 per cent presumptive level." 6
Some writers still criticize the 0.10 per cent level as being too low.
117
When the percentage of alcohol is sufficient to make it prima facie
evidence that the motorist is under the influence of alcohol, the triers of
fact are warranted in coming to the conclusion that the motorist is under
the influence of alcohol. The presumption, however, is rebuttable, not
conclusive. One way a presumption may be rebutted is where a variance
is created by two different tests. For example, assume the first test taken
by the police shows 0.11 per cent as a test result. Shortly thereafter the
motorist has his own test taken, which shows a 0.08 per cent result. If
the 0.08 test result is competent evidence, it would rebut the presumption
of intoxication raised by the 0.11 per cent test. With no presumption aris-
ing the prosecution will have to base its case on the objective symptoms
observed by the police. The final decision as to intoxication would be left
to the jury.
(d) Per cent by weight of alcohol in the blood shall be based upon milli-
grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
This section needs no comment.
(e) The foregoing provisions of this subsection shall not be contrued as
limiting the introduction of any other competent evidence bearing upon
the queston whether the person was under the influence of alcoholic bev-
erages to the extent that his normal faculties were impaired.
This section is generally self-explanatory. One issue that is raised is
whether the evidence of the chemical test alone is sufficient or whether
there must be corroborating evidence. The section does not expressly
require that there be corroborating evidence. Some jurisdictions require
corroborating evidence in addition to the results of the scientific tests."'
Probably a Florida court would find that a chemical test alone, because
it is given statutory approval and has the ability to raise presumptions,
would be sufficient evidence. Other jurisdictions have held that the test
results standing alone are sufficient to sustain a conviction."19
116. See Donigan, supra note 1, at 22-3.
117. See Erwin, supra note 1, at 90-7 (Supplement) "Although most people will be
under the influence at 0.10 per cent, some will not be under the influence until they reach
.15 per cent, and that all persons having .15 per cent or more blood alcohol will be under
the influence of alcohol." Id. at 88.
118. E.g., Schwarz v. Schneuriger, 269 Wis. 535, 69 N.W.2d 756 (1955) (strong odor
of intoxicants and eyewitness testimony as to manner of driving vehicle considered as cor-
roborating evidence).
119. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 199 A.2d 809i (1964).
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(3) Chemical analyses of the person's blood, urine, breath, or other bodily
substance to be considered valid under the provisions of this section shall
have been performed according to methods approved by the state board of
health and by an individual possessing a valid permit issued by the state
board of health for this purpose. The state board of health is authorized
to approve satisfactory techniques or methods, to ascertain the qualifica-
tions and competence of individuals to conduct such analyses, and to issue
permits which shall be subject to termination at the discretion of the state
board of health.
This provision provides the defendant with many grounds of attack
in cases where the procedures of the state board of health are not fol-
lowed or where an unqualified individual administers the test.
One procedure, which the board of health will have to follow in blood
tests, is that alcohol should not be used as a sterilizer since it has been
determined that such a sterilizer may invalidate the test results.120 The
Virginia statute specifically states that a sterilizer or cleanser "other than
alcohol or other substance which might in any way affect the accuracy of
the test" shall be used.' 2 '
IV. CONCLUSION
122
Despite the many inconsistencies, ambiguities and interpretive dif-
ficulties created, the "implied consent" statute should be valuable in set-
ting forth guidelines and directions for the police to follow.
The statute also seems to be preferable to the Supreme Court's hold-
ing in Schmerber since the motorist, unless he is unconscious, is given
an alternative to undergoing a compulsory chemical test. Paradoxically,
as a result of Schmerber, states without "implied consent" statutes can
compel a motorist to undergo a chemical test, while in states with "implied
consent" statutes the motorist has the option to refuse the test.
Although the statute is silent on the matter of whether the motorist
must be informed of his various rights, hopefully it will be the practice
120. People v. Maxwell, 18 Misc. 2d 1004, 188 N.Y.S.2d 692 (Orange County Ct. 1959);
People v. Douglas, 16 Misc. 2d 181, 183 N.Y.S.2d 945 (Jefferson County Ct. 1959). But see
People v. Malone 14 N.Y.2d 8, 197 N.E.2d 189, 247 N.Y.S.2d 641, (Ct. App. 1964) where
the doctor asked the nurse to furnish him with a non-alcoholic solution to sterilize the arm
of the defendant. The doctor assumed the nurse did so since he was not conscious of an
alcoholic odor when the solution was used by him. The court held the evidence sufficiently
positive to allow the jury to find that a non-alcoholic preparation was used.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-55 (1965).
122. Sections 3, 4, and 5 are omitted. Section 3 says that any person charged with drunk
driving shall have the right to trial by jury.
Section 4 states that the provisions of the act are severable and if any part is found
invalid then the validity of the rest of the act shall not be affected. The section involves
constitutional problems of partial invalidity, i.e., whether the remaining non-invalidated part
can be saved as a workable statute.
Section 5 states that the act takes effect July 1, 1968.
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of the police to do so. Perhaps the police could use Schmerber or "im-
plied consent" cards as a checklist to inform the motorist that he has a
right: (1) to refuse to take the test; (2) to the results of the test; and,
(3) to have a physician of his own choice administer an additional test.
In addition, the police should make a special effort to obtain a motorist's
express consent to a test. In this regard it would be helpful, whenever
feasible, for the police to obtain the motorist's signature acknowledging
that he voluntarily consented to the test after being informed of his right
to refuse. If this procedure can be followed, later disputes as to whether
the motorist refused to take the test will be avoided. In this way the en-
croachments of the individual's liberty will not be coerced, and the prose-
cution will be in a superior position to protect the public from the hazards
created by the intoxicated driver.
